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Introduction
Household nance and the economic appraisal of the value of life are central issues in the economics of aging. Although both topics make use of similar theoretical foundations based on micro-economic life-cycle models, they belong to and develop in quite separated spheres of the economic literature with apparently little exchange between them.
On the one hand, the household nance literature tackles questions related to optimal lifecycle consumption-saving and nancial portfolio choices. These questions are of rst-order importance for analyzing and designing ecient pension systems, and more generally for thinking about saving incentives. To answer such questions, many sophisticated techniques have been adopted, such as recursive models representing preferences à la Kreps and Porteus (1978) . These preferences enable to disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), which has been shown to help explaining lifecycle consumption and risky saving patterns. From a modeling standpoint, most of this literature assumes that individuals die with exogenous mortality rates. Mortality being exogenous, there is no explicit trade-o between consumption and life duration. The notion of the value of life, that precisely measures the individual willingness to give up consumption for living longer, is generally not considered.
On the other hand, the literature on the value of life is centered around questions related to mortality risk reduction. Public policies aiming at lowering mortality risksuch as road safety investments or public health campaignsare typically quite expensive and evaluated through costbenet analyses. This requires comparing the monetary amounts for nancing the new policy to human lives that have been saved or improved (less severe physical injury for instance). Therefore, having an estimate of the statistical value of life is key, and a large share of the literature has focused on obtaining robust empirical evidence. However, little use has been made of the theoretical advances that were derived in household nance, and especially of the recursive models that allow for disentangling risk aversion from the IES.
In this paper, we investigate the benets of importing knowledge from the value of life literature into household nance. In particular, we show that a proper calibration of the value of life brings new insights on the determinants of savings and portfolio choice. We motivate our work by a basic two-period model, which is sucient to show that the value of life may signicantly aect time discounting and agents' decisions, even though mortality is exogenous. The main contribution of the paper consists of the development and analysis of a large-scale, quantitative lifecycle model that is standard in most aspects but adds an additional parameter oering the exibility to match empirical estimates of the value-of life. It thereby nests the models in the previous literature as a limit case.
When the model is calibrated to match the empirical estimates of the value of life, the conclusions dier from those derived in the literature with models that implicitly assumed a negative value of life. In particular, in contrast to the seminal contributions of Michaelides (2005, 2008) , our model predicts that more risk averse households tend to save less and to participate less in the stock market. The reason is that, with non-additive preferences and a positive value of life, risk aversion amplies the role of survival risk in the discount rate. The resulting higher discount rate reduces the agent's propensity to save. Quantitatively, this eect turns out to be much stronger than the wealth accumulation induced by a higher prudence. Our result that more risk averse households participate less in the stock market and opt for more conservative portfolios re-aligns the model prediction with the common understanding of risk-taking behavior as well as with empirical evidence, see, e.g., Dohmen, et al. (2011) .
Regarding the relationship between risk aversion and savings, we provide a small empirical study suggesting that more risk averse agents do indeed save less, as predicted by our model. Specically, we use the German Socio-economic panel, because it has a measure of general risk aversion that has been shown to be a good predictor for a variety of risky behavior (Dohmen, et al. (2011) ). In our estimation strategy, we closely follow Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) and nd a highly signicant negative relationship between risk aversion and savings. Moreover, by estimating interaction terms, we nd that it is the interplay of risk aversion and mortality risk that decreases savings, while conjunction of risk aversion and income risk has an opposing eect.
This aords further support to our model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the concept of the value of a statistical life and, with the help of a basic two-period model, demonstrate why it is important for household nance. We then present our quantitative lifecycle model in Section 3. We specify utility functions in Section 4 and describe the calibration in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and discusses how they relate to the previous literature. Section 7 provides a short discussion of our supporting empirical evidence. We conclude in Section 8.
2 The value of a statistical life 2.1 A marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and consumption
We present the denition for the value of a statistical life (VSL), as well as the rationale behind it.
As a starting point for this denition we need the concept of lifetime utility. In standard lifecycle models with uncertain life duration, the lifetime utility of an agent depends on consumption levels at dierent ages and survival probabilities, as well as possibly on other factors, such as health, or leisure for instance. Denoting by c t the consumption at age t, by p t the survival probability between ages t and t + 1, and x t the vector gathering other aspects, such as health and leisure, the lifetime utility of an agent can be expressed as U (c 0 , . . . , c t , . . . , p 0 , . . . , p t , . . . , x 0 , . . . , x t , . . .).
The functional form of the function U is generally further specied, for instance through expected utility models. However, the concept of VSL is probably easier to understand if we abstract from specic functional forms. The VSL can be dened as a marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and consumption.
1 Formally, the VSL at date t, denoted V SL t , is dened as
It is worth explaining why the marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and consumption is called Value of a Statistical Life. By denition of the marginal rate of substitution, an agent would be willing to exchange εV SL t units of period-t consumption for an increase of ε in her survival probability (where 0 < ε 1 is innitesimally small). Considering a population of 1 ε identical agents, they would in aggregate be willing to pay 1 ε × εV SL t = V SL t to increase the expected number of survivors by 1 ε × ε = 1. In other words, V SL t represents the aggregate willingness-to-pay to save (on average) one life. This explains why the terminology of the value of a statistical life has been coined.
Empirical literature on the VSL
As mentioned in the introduction, the VSL is a key parameter for cost-benet analysis in policy designs. For example, about 85% of the benets of the Clean Air Act are related to mortality risk reduction, as computed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (2011). In other words, using VSL estimates that would be o by a factor of 2 would also lead to under-or overestimate the benets of the Clean Air Act by a factor of 1.8. This shows how much good estimates of the VSL are needed. This need has long been acknowledged and many researchers (e.g., see the review in Viscusi, 2003) and institutes (e.g., EPA and FDA in the USA) put signicant eort into obtaining estimates from observed behavior. Essentially, one wants to nd empirical evidence on the willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction. One approach is too look at wage-risk trade-os.
Another is to look at the willingness to pay to get safer cars, safer homes, etc. Direct questionnaires can also be informative.
Although empirical estimation proves dicult, there is a wide consensus that for most people the value of life is positive and large. There is of course some heterogeneity across studies and social context, but for a country like the USA, a VSL of 6 to 7 million dollars is considered a reasonable estimate.
2.3 Why should we care for the VSL even if mortality is exogenous?
In this section we want to emphasize that even if mortality is exogenous, assumptions made regarding the value of life have major consequences on savings behavior. In order to make this point we focus on a simple setting where people live at most two periods (0 and 1), and only care for 1 This denition is standard, see, e.g., Johansson (2002) . 4 consumption and survival.
2 Their utility is therefore a function U (c 0 , c 1 , p 0 ). A popular solution to further specify this utility function is to consider a recursive approach. This approach requires to rst compute the agent utility in period 1 (depending on her consumption and whether she is alive or not), and then to derive the period-0 utility using a recursive expression à la Kreps and Porteus (1978) . Period-1 utility, which depends on consumption c 1 and on survival status ξ 1 ∈ {alive, dead}, is denoted by U 1 (c 1 , ξ 1 ). The period-0 utility can then be expressed as
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discounting factor and φ : Im(U ) → R is an increasing concave function governing risk aversion. We assume that age eects are discarded and the periodic utilities when being alive at dates 0 and 1 are assumed to be the same, so that U 1 (c 1 , alive) = u(c 1 ). The agent has no bequest motive and does not care about her consumption after death. Consequently,
is independent of c 1 and we set U 1 (c 1 , 
The value of life. Applying denition (1) we get
The VSL is therefore connected to the value of u d , being positive if u d < u(c 1 ) and negative if
. It is standard in the household nance literature to pick values of u d that provide tractable specications without paying attention to the implied value of life. A commonly used specication is the Epstein-Zin utility function, given by u(c) =
, where 1 σ is the IES and γ controls risk aversion. Typically both σ and γ are assumed to be larger than 1. Maximal tractability is then obtained by setting
, which is homothetic, a very helpful property for deriving solutions of utility maximization problems.
This convenient specication, however, implicitly assumes a negative value of life, because γ and 2 Most of the simplifying assumptions in this subsection will be relaxed in the large-scale quantitative model of Even with exogenous mortality, using a good estimate for the VSL is important. Let us for example consider the implications on the consumption discount rate between periods 0 and 1. This discount rate can be dened as
which is the rate of change of marginal utility for a constant consumption stream. With preferences represented by (2), we obtain the following expression:
is the certainty equivalent (in utility levels) of a lottery that gives utility u(c 1 ) with probability p 0 and u d with probability 1 − p 0 . In the case where φ is ane, φ is constant, and equation 
where
is a measure of the concavity of φ and thus a measure of risk aversion. When φ is concave, the factor 1 βp0 is multiplied by the quantity exp ´u (c1) u λ φ (u)du , which intertwines risk aversion, mortality, and impatience. This exponential term depends onũ, dened in equation (6), and therefore on how u d compares to u(c 1 ).
Consider rst the case where u d < u(c 1 ), which means a positive value of life. Then, the greater the concavity of φ and the higher the mortality rate 1 − p 0 , the larger the expression exp ´u (c1) u λ φ (u)du and the discount rate δ 0 . In other words, if the value of life is positive, risk aversion amplies the impact of mortality on the discount rate: in the presence of mortality 3 Indeed, Overall, for given intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion (i.e., given functions u and φ, respectively), a model with a negative value of life will predict a lower rate of discount than the same model with a positive value of life. As a lower discount rate means larger savings, we nd that underestimating the value of life (and in particular using a negative value) is likely to exaggerate the propensity to save.
3 A quantitative life-cycle model
Having explained why it is important to carefully calibrate the value of life, we present in this section a life-cycle model that is mostly standard, but in which the utility level of the death state (u d in the previous Section) will be xed to t empirical estimates on the VSL.
The setup
We consider a partial equilibrium economy populated by an agent endowed with recursive preferences and facing several risks: a mortality risk, an income risk and an investment risk through risky nancial returns. The agent may save through bonds and a risky asset (similar to a stock).
Time is discrete, and the agent's age is denoted by t. The agent enters the model at working age, t = 0. There is a single consumption good, whose price serves as a numeraire.
Mortality risk. The agent faces mortality risk, which is assumed to be independent of any other risk in the economy. If alive at date t, the agent survives to date t + 1 with probability p t . There exists a date T M , such that the probability to live after T M is p T M = 0.
Labor income risk.
At any age, when alive, the agent receives an income denoted y t . The agent exogenously retires at age T R and during retirement (t ≥ T R ), the agent receives a constant pension income y t = y R . During working age t < T R , the agent earns a risky labor income y t = y L t , which is subject to both persistent shocks, π t , and transitory shocks, ϑ t :
The two independent processes (υ t ) t≥0 and (ϑ t ) ≥0 are IID and normally distributed with mean 0 and respective variance σ 2 υ and σ 2 ϑ . The quantityȳ in (8) represents an average, constant wage rate, while (µ t ) t≥0 is a deterministic process that contributes to t the wage process to the data and in particular the humped-shape pattern of income during active age. The parameter ρ in (9) drives the persistence of the process π.
Financial risk and security markets. The agent has the opportunity to save through a riskless one period asset (similar to a T-Bill) and a risky asset (similar to a stock). The bond is a security of price 1 which pays R f as a riskless gross return in the subsequent period. The rate of interest R f is constant and exogenous.The risky return is:
where ω represents the average risk premium of stocks over bonds, while the nancial risk (ν t ) t≥0
is an IID normally distributed process with mean 0 and variance σ 2 ν . The nancial risk is assumed to be possibly correlated to both income shocks, (υ t ) and (ϑ t ). The correlation with each income process is assumed to be constant and is denoted respectively by κ υ and κ ϑ .
The agent must pay a xed cost F ≥ 0 to participate to the stock market, which may be interpreted as an opportunity cost to discover how the stock market works. We assume it is a once-in-a-lifetime cost: if the cost is paid at a given date t, the agent can freely trade stocks at date t and at any date afterwards.
Timing and notation. At the beginning of every period, the agent rst learns the realizations of nancial and labor income shocks and whether she is alive or not. She thus knows the amount of her current savings and, if she is alive, her current income. More precisely, at any date t, we assume that the agent knows the entire history of all shocks up to date t, which is formalized by the natural ltration (F t ) generated by the processes (υ t ), (ϑ t ), and (ν t ). The alive agent then decides her consumption level c t , her savings in bonds b t and stocks s t , and her stock market participation status η t (equal to 0, if she has never paid the participation cost before and therefore never participated).
Constraints.
If the agent is dead at date t, she bequeaths all her wealth w t :
The stock holding s t−1 may be null if the agent has never participated to the stock market.
If the agent is alive, her resources at the beginning of the period consist of stock and bond payos plus the labor income y t of the period. Resources cover consumption as well as the purchase of bonds and stocks. The agent can only invest in stocks if the participation cost, F , has been paid at some date prior to t, i.e., if η t = 1. Moreover, the agent may also have to pay the participation cost F at date t if she participates at date t in the stock market for the rst time, i.e., if η t = 1 and η t−1 = 0. The budget constraint at date t of the alive agent can then be expressed as follows:
where 1 ηs=1 is an indicator function equal to 1 if η s = 1 and 0 otherwise. Neither asset can be sold short and consumption must be strictly positive:
c t > 0.
A feasible allocation is a sequence of choices (c t , b t , s t , η t ) t≥0 satisfying the constraints (10)(13).
The set of feasible allocations is denoted A.
Regarding initial conditions, we assume without loss of generality that η −1 = 0 and b −1 ≥ 0 and s −1 ≥ 0 are exogenous values. Equations (10) and (11) can be assumed to hold at date t = 0.
Preferences
We denote by u(c t ) : R + → I the instantaneous felicity the agent gets when being alive and consuming c t and by v(w t ) the utility she derives when being dead and bequeathing the amount w t . Preferences are separable over time and future instantaneous utilities are discounted by a factor β ∈ (0, 1) representing the agent's exogenous time preference.
Regarding risk preferences, we consider recursive utilities à la Kreps and Porteus (1978) . Agents value the certainty equivalent of future utility streams. More precisely, for an increasing concave function Φ : R → R, the utility U t at date t expresses as follows: 4
In the above equation, E
F ×G t
[·] is the conditional expectation operator with respect to the information available at date t. Formally, the information is the ltration (
is the ltration generated by the independent mortality process. The factor 1 − β multiplying u t in equation (14) is a normalization that simplies the expression of the utility of a dead agent (see equation (15) 4 Formally speaking, preferences are dened over the set of temporal lotteries, allowing for preferences for late or early uncertainty resolution. See Epstein and Zin (1989) or Wakai (2007) for a formal treatment.
In such models, if there were no uncertainty, the utility U t would be independent of the function Φ and the recursion (14) would reduce to U t = (1−β)u t +βU t+1 . We thus have a possible separation between preferences over certain consumption streams (determined by the functions u, v and the scalar β) and risk preferences driven by the function Φ. A more concave Φ implies lower certainty
and therefore greater risk aversion.
Our specication of recursive preferences nests some of the most standard cases, including the additive specication, the Epstein and Zin (1989) isoelastic specication, and the risk-sensitive specication introduced by Hansen and Sargent (1995) in their work on robustness. In Section 4, we make precise the functions Φ which correspond to these dierent popular specications. Our results will make it possible to discuss the impact of these specications on saving decisions.
Agent's program
We can now write the agent's program recursively by taking advantage of the structure of preferences. We denote by U D t the intertemporal utility at date t of a dead agent and by U A t that of an alive agent. Regarding the dead agent, note that the instantaneous utility of an agent dead for more than one period is constant (all bequests take place in the rst period after death) and equal to v(0). From the recursive formulation (14), we deduce that there is no actual optimization and that the program of a dead agent can be expressed as:
While alive, the agent maximizes her intertemporal utility by choosing a feasible allocation (c t , b t , s t , η t ) t≥0 in the set A. The utility U
A of the alive agent depends on four state variables:
the beginning-of-period holdings in stocks s t−1 and bonds b t−1 , the permanent shock π t−1 of labor income and the stock market participation η t−1 ∈ {0, 1}. The latter is discrete, while the three former ones are continuous. From the recursive formulation (14) and feasibility constraints (10)(13) and using the fact that the mortality risk is assumed to be independent of other risks, the program of an alive agent at date t can be expressed as follows:
where E t [·] is the expectation for an alive agent with respect to the ltration F (i.e., made of all past shock realizations but death). Note that we distinguish it from the expectation E F ×G t
[·] with respect to the whole information (F t ⊗ G t ) t≥0 (including death information). It should be noted that the program (16) has a nite-horizon since there exists a maximal age for the agent, T M .
Value of life
Applying the denition in equation (1), we derive the following expression for the value of a statistical life at age t:
We will use this expression to calibrate the model to empirical estimates of the VSL, cf. Section 5.
Specications of utility functions
We now specify the functional forms for felicity functions u and v and for the aggregator Φ.
Felicity function specication
We begin with specifying u and v. We assume that the agent has a constant IES, which means
is constant. This implies that u is equal, up to an ane transformation, to:
where the parameter σ > 0 is the inverse of the IES. The above specication is such that u(1) = 0.
It embeds therefore a normalization assumption, which is without generality loss. The case σ = 1 is obtained by continuity from the general case.
The felicity derived from bequeathing wealth w is assumed to have the following functional form:
where v = −v(0) ∈ R, θ ≥ 0, σ is the inverse of the IES used in the expression (18) of the felicity of u, and w ≥ 0 is a parameter that we discuss below. As for u, the case σ = 1 in (19) is obtained by continuity from the general case.
We can distinguish two components in the specication of v in equation (19) . The rst one is the term (-v) , which corresponds to the dierence in utility between being dead and bequeathing nothing and being alive and consuming one unit. This dierence is negative if death is not as good as being alive with one unit of consumption, the constant v being then positive. A higher (resp. lower) value of v will be associated with a higher (resp. lower) valuation of being alive, Ameriks et al. (2011 ), and Lockwood (2012 , 2014 .
It is sometimes assumed in the literature that v = 1−θw
which has some advantage in terms of tractability.
6 However, this constraint on v implies a nontrivial relationship between the utility of bequest and the value of life. In particular, if θ is set to zero (no altruism) and σ > 1, then the utility of being dead is always higher to that of being alive, implying a negative value of life. We will not make assumptions of these kinds as we want our model to match standard empirical estimates for the value of life.
We now discuss discuss the two functional forms we consider for the function Φ.
Risk-sensitive preferences
First, we consider risk-sensitive preferences:
where k is a constant driving risk aversion. The case k = 0 corresponds to the usual additive model and is obtained by continuity of the general case. For an agent endowed with risk-sensitive preferences to be more risk averse than in the usual additive model, we need to assume that k > 0.
Risk-sensitive preferences have been introduced in Hansen and Sargent (1995) and axiomatized in Strzalecki (2011) . As shown in Bommier, Kochov and LeGrand (2016) , this is the only functional form Φ for which preferences represented by the utility function in recursion (14) are monotone.
The monotonicity of preferences has to be understood as monotonicity with respect to rst-order available and the rst one is preferred to the other one in any possible state of the world, the former will always be preferred to the latter. This is distinct from and not implied by the fact that more certain consumption is preferred to less, which in our setup is equivalent to an increasing felicity function u. Moreover, as proved in Bommier and LeGrand (2014) , risk-sensitive preferences are well-ordered with respect to risk aversion, both in the large (i.e., in terms of willingness-topay to eliminate all risks) but also in the small (i.e. in terms of willingness-to-pay for marginal risk reductions). This last aspect is important when addressing problems where complete risk elimination is not possible, or simply not optimal, as is the case in the portfolio choice that we study.
Epstein-Zin preferences
Second, we consider Epstein-Zin isoelastic preferences, which correspond to the following functional form for Φ:
where γ ∈ R and 1 + (1 − σ)u ≥ 0. 7 Whenever γ = σ (but possibly dierent from 1), we get Φ(u) = u and Epstein-Zin preferences are additive. It is also well-known from Tallarini (2000) , and directly visible from the last two lines of (21), that when σ = 1 Epstein-Zin preferences coincide with risk-sensitive preferences. Thus, the cases where σ = 1 are already addressed with risk-sensitive preferences and do not need further consideration. We will therefore exclude them whenever we refer to Epstein-Zin preferences below. For σ = 1, the constraint 1 + (1 − σ)u ≥ 0 is not trivial. It holds whenever the agent is alive, since we have 1 + (1 − σ)u(c) = c 1−σ , but imposes constraints on the felicity of bequest dened in equation (19) . ), and therefore dierent functions Φ (the constant 1 being no longer needed). Our (equivalent) approach has however the advantage to have the cases σ = 1 or γ = 1 directly obtained as limit cases of the others, while keeping v or w independent of σ and γ. This normalization choice has no impact on our results. Isoelastic Epstein-Zin preferences are very popular in macroeconomics and nance, one of their main advantage being that they usually provide a homogeneous specication, which is key for tractability. Note that this is not the case in our setup, where Epstein-Zin preferences are not homothetic. The reason is not the normalization that we made in equation (21), but stems from our choice of imposing a plausible value of statistical life.
An inconvenient aspect of Epstein-Zin preferences is that they are not monotone.
This may
yield unintuitive conclusions in some cases, even though this is not the case in the current paper.
Calibration and computation
In this section, we rst give an overview of our calibration strategy. We then discuss the resulting parametrization in detail. The last section discusses the main aspects of solving the model computationally.
Calibration strategy
Our calibration shares many common aspects with the related literature but diers mainly in that we target the value of a statistical life explicitly. Given a realistic value of life, the objective of the calibration exercise is to highlight the impact of risk aversion. To this aim, we consider three agents: one with standard additively separable preferences, one with Epstein-Zin preferences corresponding to the aggregator (21), and one with risk-sensitive preferences corresponding to the aggregator (20).
9 We will henceforth refer to the three agents as the additive, the Epstein-Zin and the risk-sensitive agent, respectively. Importantly, we calibrate only the additive agent to the data.
The other two are built using the parameters of the additive specication but assuming a higher degree of risk aversion (k > 0 for risk-sensitive preferences and γ > σ for Epstein-Zin preferences).
We now describe our strategy for calibrating the additive agent; the resulting parameter values are discussed in the following sections. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 σ , to a standard value. We then jointly calibrate the discount factor, β, the bequest motive, θ, and the life-death utility gap, v, to match the following three targets. The rst target is an estimate of the value of a statistical life at age 45, V SL 45 , as dened in equation (17). Targeting this is central to our exercise. The second and third targets are average assets at age 45 and average bequests at age 90, respectively. All other parameters are set to values that are taken directly from available data or related studies. We do this, because we want the increases in risk-aversion to be of similar magnitude, whether it is achieved with risk-sensitive or Epstein-Zin preferences. Both the Epstein-Zin and risk-sensitive agents are more risk averse than the additive agent but are not comparable with each other in terms of risk aversion.
Demographics
A model period corresponds to one year. Agents start being economically active in the model at the working age of 20. They exogenously retire at the xed age of 65, which corresponds to the statutory retirement age in the U.S. Mortality rates are taken from the Human Mortality Database for the USA for 2007. The maximum biological age is capped at 100, since mortality estimates become inaccurate after that.
Preferences
The IES is set to 0.5, a common value in the literature, so that its inverse is σ = 2. For the Epstein-Zin agent we increase the risk aversion parameter moderately to γ EZ = 3, since we do want not deviate too much from the additive agent. Last, for the risk-sensitive agent, we calibrate the risk aversion parameter to match the same average savings as the Epstein-Zin agent at the age of 45, which yields k = 0.09.
We then calibrate v, β, and θ jointly so that the additive agent has a value of a statistical life at age 45, assets at age 45, and bequest at age 90, that match their empirical counterparts. For VSL we target US$ 6.5 million, which is in the middle of available estimates. 10 For average individual assets we target US$ 100 000, which is consistent with Census data, while for bequest we match US$ 50 000 at age 90. This yields v = 1.48 × 10 −3 , β = 0.93, and θ = 5.3 which we keep constant for the three agents. 11 Note that the value of v looks small because it corresponds to an incomeȳ approximately equal to 22000 USD.
Indeed,v would amount to 32.3, if the incomeȳ would have been normalized to 1. 
Endowments
Pensions are set to one third of the average wage, in line with the U.S. social security replacement rate. The deterministic age-productivity prole is taken from Harenberg and Ludwig (2015) , who compute it from PSID data using the method of Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011) . The values are displayed in the computational appendix.
12
The values for the persistent income process are taken from Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) . Using PSID data, they nd an autocorrelation ρ = 0.95 and a variance of shocks of σ 2 υ = 0.30. We also use their value for the variance of the temporary income shock, which is set to σ 2 ϑ = 0.12. Regarding correlations with stock returns, we take the values from the baseline case of Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and set for the permanent shocks κ υ = 0.15 and for the transitory one κ ϑ = 0.30.
Asset markets
The parameter values for asset markets are mostly preliminary. The gross risk-free return is set to the average bond return of the last 50 years in the data of Robert Shiller, R f = 1.01 percent. 13
The equity premium takes a value of ω = 3%. Stock volatility is σ ν = 0.18, again as measured from Robert Shiller's data over the last 50 years. Participation cost is set to a preliminary value of F = 3620 USD to get a reasonable stock market participation rate for the additive agent.
Computational solution
From a computational perspective, the solution is mostly standard, but there are two issues when solving the model that are worth mentioning. The rst issue is that we want to numerically approximate the risks as precisely as possible. Typically, the autoregressive process driving the persistent income shock is discretized as a nite Markov chain, e.g., using the method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991) . However, this has been shown to be sensitive both in statistical as well as economic terms and it cannot handle cross-correlated processes.
14 Instead of relying on a nitestate approximation, we keep the continuous representation in equations (8) and (9) 12 The computational appendix is available on request.
13 Robert Shiller's data are freely available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
14 See, e.g., Flodén (2008) and Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) . Also more recent methods like Kopecky and Suen (2010) can't directly handle cross-correlated processes. 16 We solve this with a novel solution algorithm that is robust, fast, and generally applicable to nite-horizon problems. The main idea is to interpolate the expected continuation utility, E t U t+1 , with a multi-dimensional cubic B-spline, because it can be proven that E t U t+1 is twice dierentiable. The divide and conquer algorithm of Gordon and Qiu (2015) is then used to quickly nd a bracket for a global maximum on a ne grid. Given the bracket, the maximum is then computed with high precision using a Newton-like maximizing routine, which can be defended with the result of Clausen and Strub (2012) on the local dierentiability around an optimum.
On top of that, we speed up the algorithm by making use of the fact that, after minor transformations, the optimal stock choice can be represented and computed as a function of the optimal savings choice. Programmed in Fortran 2008, the code is parallelized and runs on 24 cores. Further details are provided in the computational appendix.
Results
We rst describe the outcomes of the model, as calibrated in Section 5. Then we provide further explanation by relating our ndings to the previous literature.
Lifecycle proles
To present our results, we focus on average lifecycle proles for agent choices. Each prole corresponds to the prole conditional on the agent surviving until the maximal age, averaged over all possible realizations for the income and investment risks. For agents who die before the maximal 15 Even recent, more general envelope theorems are of only very limited use in a computational application. E.g., the very powerful result in Clausen and Strub (2012) is not directly applicable, because in a numerical solution we search for an optimal choice and need to evaluate continuation utility also at points that are not optimal and may therefore not be dierentiable. The computational appendix provides more details.
16 The two continuous states are cash-at-hand, xt, and the stochastic state, πt, the discrete states are the 80 generations and the stock market participation indicator. The continuous choices are bond and stock investments and the discrete choice is stock market participation.
age, the savings-consumption proles are simply truncated at the age of death. Lifecycle proles for savings for example are computed as follows. For a given age, we compute the optimal saving response as a function of cash-at-hand as well as the distribution (conditional on surviving) of agents in terms of cash-at-hand.
17 From both optimal saving responses and conditional distribution, we directly get the average saving at each age.
The panels in Figure 1 display the lifecycle proles for the additive, risk-sensitive and EpsteinZin agent. Let us rst focus on total lifecycle savings, which are shown in panel (a). Overall, the shape of the saving prole is very similar for the three agents. As is typical of such lifecycle models, the agents build up savings during their working age, until they reach the exogenous retirement age of 65, and then gradually decumulate their savings. However, the agents dier markedly in the level of savings they accumulate. The additive agent saves much more on average than both the Epstein-Zin and risk-sensitive agents. The reason is the one explained in Section 2.3, namely that risk aversion amplies the role of mortality risk in the discount rate, as long as the value of a statistical life is positive. Since both the Epstein-Zin and the risk-sensitive agent are more risk averse than the additive one, and that we assume a positive VSL, their discount rates are higher than that of the additive agent, and therefore they save less. Crucially, this eect is strong enough to overturn the higher savings due to higher prudence of more risk-averse agents. Note that the impact of risk aversion is not strictly identical for risk-sensitive and Epstein-Zin agents, except at age 45, where savings are the same because of our calibration strategy, cf. Section 5.1.
In particular, savings decrease more for the risk-sensitive agent at earlier age (before 45), but the pattern is reversed for later ages (after 45).
The corresponding lifecycle consumption proles are shown in panel (b). They are consistent with the lifecycle saving proles. Note that consumption proles for the three agents are humpshaped. The risk averse agents consume more at earlier ages (between ages 30 and 60) than the additive agent. The opposite holds at older ages, greater than 60. A greater risk aversion tends therefore to increase consumption at earlier age and to decrease it a later age. Again, this is consistent with the fact that risk aversion amplies the role of mortality in the discount rate. A more risk averse agent will be more impatient and therefore consume early.
Let us now turn to the lifecycle stock market participation rates, displayed in panel (c). The participation rates are an increasing function of age, because the cost to access the stock market is paid only once in life. Importantly, the more risk averse agents, i.e., the Epstein-Zin and risksensitive agents, on average participate less in the stock market. While it is intuitive that the 17 Since the shocks are continuous, we get a continuous distribution over cash-at-hand. We approximate this distribution with a piecewise linear function over 3600 points in the cash at hand grid. For details, see the computational appendix. more risk-averse agents would choose to have a smaller exposure to the investment risk, this result stands in contrast to the previous literature. The reason for the dierent nding is that we assume a positive VSL, implying that the more risk averse agents accumulate less assets and are therefore less willing to pay the participation cost.
Conditional on participation, more risk averse agents hold a smaller share of their savings in stocks until age 80, cf. panel (d) . After age 80 the wealth of agents becomes very low, which explains the increasing share in stock. Thus, more risk averse agents consistently choose to take less risks: rst, by participating less in the stock market, and second, by holding a smaller share of wealth in risky assets if they participate.
Last, but not least, Panel (e) of Figure 1 plots the lifecycle prole of the VSL. It is positive at all ages, and has a inverse U-shape. As explained above, it is calibrated such that the additive agent has a VSL of approximately US $ 6.5 million at age 45. The VSL of the Epstein-Zin and the risk-sensitive agent are substantially larger until age 68 because of their higher risk aversion.
After age 68, the VSL of the additive agent is slightly higher, because of his higher consumption stream at older ages.
Relation to previous literature
Our calibrated life-cycle model provides news insights on life-cycle behavior. In particular, we nd that risk aversion decreases savings, stock market participation, and the share of wealth invested in stocks. This contrasts with the predictions of Michaelides (2005, 2008) and many related papers in the household nance literature. The divergence in predictions is directly related to value of life matters. In the current paper, our model was designed to t empirical estimate of the VSL. Therefore, by construction the model provides a large and positive VSL. In that respect, our approach diers from the standard one in household nance, which consists in focusing on a homothetic version of Epstein-Zin preferences, without paying attention to the implications regarding the value of life. According to the homothetic version of the Epstein-Zin specication, the utility conditional on being alive at time t, denoted V t , can then be expressed as
where, as before, c t is consumption in period t, p t is the probability of remaining alive in period t + 1, and w t+1 is the amount bequeathed in case of death. 18 The parameter σ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, γ the coecient of relative risk aversion and b the intensity of the 18 A formal derivation of equation (22) can be found in the appendix of Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009). bequest motives. This model was not designed for tting a specic VSL but rather chosen for its tractability. Equation (22) nevertheless implicitly assumes a specic value of life given by:
It occurs that the VSL may be positive or negative. In particular, if γ > 1, as is assumed in the papers mentioned above, a positive value of life is obtained only if b >
. The results of Michaelides (2005, 2008) tend to indicate that such an equality does not hold (at least not always) in their simulations. In particular, a negative value of life is systematically obtained when there is no bequest motives (b = 0), a case that Gomes and Michaelides consider in several instances, with no signicant impact on their qualitative ndings about the relationship between risk aversion and savings. As explained in Section 2.3, with a negative value of life, the rate of time discounting is underestimated, the bias being amplied by risk aversion. That is, for the case of a negative VSL, risk aversion is found to lower the discount rate, and hence to increase savings, providing a conclusion which is opposite to ours.
19 The dierence in saving behavior eventually generates dierences in the propensity to pay the xed cost associated with stock market participation. This explains why they nd that more risk averse agents tend to participate more frequently in the stock market, while we obtain the converse.
It has often been thought as intuitive that the more risk averse an agent, the more she will save.
This naturally arises in models where there is no mortality risk (see, e.g., Bommier and LeGrand, 2016) . But as soon as there is mortality risk, the driving force is typically mortality. When the VSL is negative, the eect of mortality will go in the same direction as that of prudence. With a positive VSL, in contrast, the eect of mortality will go in the other direction, and indeed overturn the eect of prudence.
Supporting evidence
In this section we present results from a short empirical study on the relationship between risk aversion and household savings. Our results indicate that savings comove negatively with risk aversion in the data and that the regression coecient is highly signicant. We rst describe the data, then explain our estimation strategy and nally present the related results.
19 One should moreover notice that if specication (22) were to be used with γ > 1 and a parameter b large enough to generate positive values of life, we would obtain a framework where the intensity of bequest motives would increase the willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction. This goes against intuition, since deriving utility from bequest reduces the welfare gap between life and death.
Data description
The data comes from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), which is an annual panel of German households starting in 1984. It covers a wide range of information, including nancial situation and personal attitudes. Importantly, it also has a measure of general risk aversion, which asks respondents to rate their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 (not willing at all) to 10 (very willing). Dohmen, et al. (2011) translate the question from German as How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means:`not at all willing to take risks' and the value 10 means:`very willing to take risks'. The question is on purpose not focusing on a single risk and doesn't make use of a lottery. This is an advantage in our context, where we consider aversion towards very dierent risks. As shown by Dohmen, et al. (2011) , this measure is a good predictor of risky behavior such as investing in stock or smoking. They also validate the measure by conducting a eld experiment with an additional representative sample of 450 subjects.
They conclude that there seems to be a general trait of risk aversion aecting behavior in dierent contexts and that the SOEP measure is a good approximation. We are therefore condent that we can use it to study the impact of risk aversion on savings.
We use the SOEP waves 2004 and 2008-2014 because risk aversion is available only in those.
We keep only observations where the household head answered the household questionnaire and associate the personal characteristics of the head to that household. After dropping observations with missing or inadmissible values for risk aversion, the sample contains 24.603 households.
Household monthly net income is available in the data. Since nancial wealth is not directly available for all waves, we follow Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) (henceforth, FSS) and impute it from interest and dividend income. As an alternative, we also use the reported value of the house as an indicator for nancial wealth.
Regressions
Our model predicts that the more risk averse an agent, the more she saves. To test this prediction, we regress the logarithm of monthly savings on the risk aversion index, while controlling for several factors.
20 In particular, we need to control for income, mortality risk, wealth, as well as other saving motives. The rst control we use is the logarithm of nancial wealth, to account for the fact that savings are path-dependent and that the prediction of our model is for agents endowed with the same initial wealth. For the other controls, we closely follow FSS. More precisely, regarding 20 Formally, the index in the data varies between 0 and 10 and the larger the index, the more the respondent is willing to take risks. We then dene our risk aversion index as 10−this index. the income process, we control for permanent income and a measure of the income risk. For permanent income, we replicate the construction of FSS.
21 To limit the eect of measurement errors and of bias due to the small number of observations for every household, we run a two-stage regression, by instrumenting the logarithm of permanent income by education and age variables (including the square of these variables and the interaction term). For every household, we measure income risk as the standard deviation of the dierence between actual income and permanent income (at the household level). Second, we control mortality risk as in FSS by using age and age squared. Other saving motives are proxied by the following control variables: education, square of education, gender, household size, number of children, and dummy variables for marital status, current residence (1 if in former West Germany and 0 otherwise), and survey year. Finally, we cluster standard errors by household.
In order to further test the model predictions, we include two other variables besides risk aversion. The rst one is an interaction term between risk aversion and income risk, capturing a precautionary savings motive. The model predicts this regression coecient to be positive.
The second additional variable is an interaction term between risk aversion and mortality risk.
According to the model, the regression coecient should be negative.
On the whole, we run four regressions. The rst regression is the one including risk aversion, as well as all control variables. It does not include any of the two interaction terms. The second and third regressions include one single additional interaction term, between risk aversion and income risk and between risk aversion and mortality risk respectively. Finally, the last regression includes both interaction terms together.
Results
The results of our four regressions are displayed in Table 2 . *** signicant at the 1 percent level; ** signicant at the 5 percent level; * signicant at the 10 percent level.
The rst conclusion that we can draw from our regression results is that risk aversion has a negative impact on savings. More risk averse agents, when controlling for wealth, income risk, and mortality risk, tend to save less. The regression coecient is consistently highly signicant in all regressions. Looking at the specications that include interaction terms, we nd that the interaction between risk aversion and income risk has a positive eect, though not highly signicant (p-values vary between 15% and 20%). This nding, in spite of weak signicance, is consistent with the predictions of our model. The interaction between risk aversion and mortality risk has a negative impact on savings. The regression coecient is signicant at the 10% level. The (negative) eect of risk aversion on savings is amplied by the level of mortality. This last nding is also predicted by our model.
Conclusion
The notion of value of life is generally not discussed in the household nance literature. Actually, there is a real cost in using models that are exible enough to provide realistic estimates of value of life: preference homotheticity has to be relaxed, which of course translates into an increased diculty at the optimization stage. With the current paper, we want to argue that it is denitely worth making this extra eort. The value of life plays indeed a key role in the relation between mortality, risk aversion and time discounting. It is therefore a key determinant of life-cycle behavior, even if mortality is exogenous.
Once the value of life is set at reasonable positive levels, we nd that risk aversion has a negative impact on savings, stock market participation and the the share of wealth held in risky assets. The basic intuition is the following: saving involves keeping resources for periods that are only lived in favorable odds (i.e., in a case of a long life). Saving is thus like a bet that pays in good outcomes (i.e., survival) an therefore a risk increasing behavior. Our results indicate, rather intuitively, that risk aversion reduces the propensity to engage in risky behaviors and therefore to save. The results regarding stock market participation and the the share of wealth held in risky assets reect both direct risk aversion eect and indirect wealth eect. Let us however notice that if we were to assume that having a long life is a bad outcome, that is if assuming a negative value of life, the logic would be reversed. Savings would then imply keeping resources for adverse realizations (long lives) and would then be a risk reducing behavior. The result would then be that risk aversion increases savings, exactly because of the assumption of a negative value of life.
One of the implications of our study, is that relatively low level of savings could be explained by risk aversion. While the economic literature abounds of works arguing that observed saving behaviors have to reect strongly myopic preferences or some form of irrationality, our analysis suggests on the contrary that saving little could just be a rational decision for risk averse agents who are well aware that life duration is uncertain. Of course, low saving levels typically result in having a majority of (surviving) elderly declaring that they failed to save enough. But this is not evidence of under-savings. If they could be questioned, those who died before retirement may well answer that they actually saved too much.
